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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

Case No. 940602-CA

MARK J. HOBEL,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from conditional pleas of guilty to one
count of possession of a counterfeit substance (methamphetamine)
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, and one count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
(marijuana) , a third degree felony, both in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994), and one count of violation of the
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (1994) .

This Court has jurisdiction

over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1994) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the magistrate properly determine that the affidavit

in support of the search warrant was sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause?
"In reviewing the magistrate's finding of probable cause to
support a search warrant based on an affidavit, we will find the
warrant invalid only if the magistrate, given the totality of the
circumstances, lacked a 'substantial basis' for determining that

probable cause existed."
(Utah 1993).

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260

A reviewing court examines the affidavit as a whole,

in a common-sense fashion, and accords the magistrate's decision
great deference.
2.

Id. at 1260.

Did the trial court properly determine that the officer

acted in good faith in relying on the search warrant?
A trial court's finding that an officer relied in good faith
on a defective search warrant is subject to a de novo review by the
appellate court.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App.

1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant provisions, statutes, or rules are cited in the
body of the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Based on information provided by a confidential informant, a
police officer serving as supervisor of the Iron and Beaver
Counties Narcotics Task Force prepared an affidavit to support a
search warrant, which was then duly signed by a magistrate (R. 5964 or addendum a) .

Pursuant to the warrant, police officers

searched a home, located drugs in the home, and arrested defendant
(R. 4) . Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the evidence (R.
12) .

After a hearing on the matter, the trial court issued a

written memorandum opinion and order denying the motion (R 53-57).
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to all three
charges, from which he now appeals on the same grounds he asserted
in his suppression motion (R. 75-82, 103).
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 27, 1993, during an early morning drug raid, Robert
Yates was arrested and charged with two second degree felonies (R.
62-63, 117). At the county jail, Yates spoke with Garth Wilkinson,
supervisor of the Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force and a
police officer with 26 years of experience (R* 116, 120). Yates,
the confidential informant in this case, detailed information to
Wilkinson about a local drug operation (R. 62-63 or addendum a; R.
55 or addendum b).
a.

b.
c.
d.

e.

£•
g.

h.

i.

The facts Yates provided were that:

there were two Mexican males present in a
clearly identified house who regularly
delivered large quantities of drugs to
Iron County,
that one speaks English, the other does
not,
that the one who speaks English is called
"Marcos,"
that within the preceding 24 hours the
informant had observed five pounds of
marijuana and one quarter pound of
methamphetamine in the house,
that
the
informant
had
previously
purchased controlled substances from
"Marcos" at that house on several
occasions,
that there is a dog at the residence
named "Ginger," also referred to as "Here
Dog" which is vicious and will bite,
that the informant was in the residence
the previous night and observed rrarijuana
and methamphetamine in a large fcrtlocker
and digital scales in "Marcos'" dresser
drawer,
that to prove his trustworthiness, the
confidential informant claimed he could
identify several drug traffickers in the
Iron County area,
that the confidential informant then
identified seven individuals known to the
affiant [i.e. Officer Wilkinson] to be
involved in the selling and buying of
narcotics in the Iron County area.
3

(R. 55 or addendum b).

In connection with this information, the

Iron County attorney offered Yates a plea bargain on the condition
that the information he provided proved to be correct (R. 62 or
addendum a ) .
Based on an affidavit containing the information detailed by
Yates, the magistrate issued a search warrant for the Marcos
residence.

In the resultant search, police officers discovered

approximately five and a half pounds of marijuana and one and a
half ounces of methamphetamine (R. 27) . Defendant, who was in the
home, was arrested and charged with one count of possession of a
counterfeit substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute,
a second degree felony; one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute (marijuana) , a second degree
felony; and violation of the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, a second
degree felony (R. 72-73).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first asserts that the affidavit in support of the
search warrant

was

probable

determination.

cause

informant's

insufficient

reliability,

to
This

which

support

the

argument

defendant

magistrate's

turns

attacks

on

on

the

several

grounds: that the informant was acting solely out of self-interest;
that the informant was under the influence of drugs; that the
informant provided inconsistent information; and several lesser
grounds.
Defendant's

string

important circumstances.

of

factors,

however,

ignores

other

For example, the informant based his
4

factual account on personal observations made inside the target
home within 24 hours of talking to the police.

In addition, the

informant provided considerable detail in his factual account.
And, finally, the officer tested the informant's veracity by asking
him to provide certain drug-related information that the officer
personally knew to be true.
circumstances,

the

Considering the totality of the

magistrate

had

a

substantial

basis

for

determining that probable cause for the issuance of the warrant
existed.
Even if the warrant was found to be defective, however, the
officers acted in good faith, thus precluding suppression of any
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant.

Defendant has simply

provided no credible record support for his assertion that the
officers acted recklessly in relying on the warrant.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF PROBABLE
CAUSE
The law is clear that " [b]efore issuing a search warrant, a
neutral magistrate must review an affidavit containing specific
facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause." State v.
Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517

(Utah App. 1992)

(citing State v.

Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 1036
(1992)).

A magistrate determining whether probable cause exists

makes "a practical common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
5

'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability

that

contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
On appeal, considering the affidavit in its entirety, the
reviewing court "determine[s] whether the issuing magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that there were enough facts
within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed."

State

v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991, cert,
denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992)).
circumstances, this threshold

If, under the totality of the
is reached, then the reviewing

court's work is done. See State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah
1987) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 233-34) . This is
a deferential standard of review.

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d at

1260.
In

this

case,

defendant

attacks

only

the

informant's

reliability, citing a string of factors that he believes undermine
the informant's reliability and, therefore, support his assertion
that the affidavit was insufficient to support a probable cause
determination (See Br. of App. at 7-8). When all of the factors
relevant to the informant's reliability are considered, however,
defendant's argument must fail.
First, defendant claims that the informant was unreliable
because he had been charged with two felonies "and would have done
anything to get out of his situation" (Br. of App. at 7) . The very
6

fact that Yates was cooperating with the police in order to lessen
his own criminal liability, however, only served to bolster his
motivation to provide truthful information.

State v. Buford, 820

P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991) . Plainly, if the information the
informant provided proved to be false, the plea bargain would be
negated and the informant would receive no benefit

(R. 62 or

addendum a ) .
Defendant makes much of State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah
App. 1993) , a case he believes "is directly on point" (Br. of App.
at 5).

While defendant never specifically elucidates in what

respect he believes this to be so, presumably he is referring to
the fact that the informant in Potter provided information in order
to receive a break, and so was inherently more suspect than a
citizen informant with nothing to gain from the interaction.

See

State v. Potter, 860 P.2d at 957. The crux of Potter, however, is
its evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, which revealed
that the detective included allegations in the affidavit that were
directly contrary to observations he had personally made inside the
target home.

In essence, the detective not only failed to provide

any corroboration for the informant's data but also misled the
magistrate by withholding material information that bore directly
on the reliability of the informant.

Id.

Plainly, no such

circumstances are present in this case.
Second, defendant asserts that when the informant was arrested
and provided the police with information and entered the plea
bargain, he was under the influence of drugs. He argues that the
7

officer should have known this and, consequently, not relied on the
informant

(Br. of App. at 8) -1

At the suppression hearing,

however, Officer Wilkinson testified repeatedly that Yates did not
appear to him to be under the influence of drugs (R. 117, 120,
121) .

Furthermore, the trial court, in its written opinion and

order, specifically found "that there is no credible evidence that
Mr. Wilkinson knew the informant was under the influence of drugs
during

their

discussion

of

the

information

included

in his

affidavit" (R. 56 or addendum b) . Under the circumstances of this
case, the magistrate simply chose to believe the officer rather
than the proffered testimony of the informant.

The law is well-

settled that credibility determinations belong uniquely to the
trier of fact. See, e.g. , State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah
1993); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991); State v.
Baalev, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). Absent a demonstration of
clear error, not present here, defendant's claim must fail.
Third,

defendant

asserts

that

the

informant

provided

inconsistent information about the quantity of drugs to be found in
the home (Br. of App. at 8) . Defendant does not, however, point to
any place in the record supporting this alleged inconsistency.
Where defendant provides no evidentiary support for his naked
assertion, this Court should refuse to consider the allegation.
See, e.g. , State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 959, cert, denied, 836 P.2d
1383 (Utah 1992).

1

At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that the
informant would have so testified (R. 122-23).
8

Defendant's other contentions are equally without merit. That
Yates had never previously served as an informant should not count
against him, although the reverse —

that someone had provided

reliable information in the past -- would establish veracity on a
subsequent occasion.

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; State v.

Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) ; see also United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580-81 (1971) (discussing with approval case
in which informant's information provided on previous occasion
contributed to reliability).

Similarly, that the officer did not

personally know the informant and had no personal knowledge of the
specific facts alleged in this case is not dispositive in light of
the totality of the circumstances described.

Finally, defendant

asserts that the informant failed to provide a description of the
premises to be searched

(Br. of App. at 8) .

The trial court

opinion plainly states, however, that the informant took the police
officer to the target home "for identification purposes so a proper
description could be included in the affidavit" (R. 54 or addendum
b) . Surely, the physical act of taking the officer to the home may
be equated with a verbal description of the place.
Although defendant has focused on the reliability of the
informant, he has not examined all of the circumstances that
contributed to the magistrate's determination.2

For example,

defendant has ignored the fact that the informant's basis of
2

Defendant's fundamental misunderstanding of reliability is
evidenced by his reference to the "reliability test" articulated in
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991) (Br. of App. at 89). Ramirez deals specifically with the reliability of eyewitness
testimony and has nothing at all to do with the facts of this case.
9

knowledge was personal, arising from observations he had made
within

24 hours

in the target

home.

"Courts have

consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the
informant's knowledge is based on personal experience."

State v.

Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Hansen,
732 P.2d at 130; State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 287 (Utah App.
1990); State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989), cert,
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (1990)).
knowledge

was

based

Where, as here, the informant's

on personal

observation,

the

"basis of

knowledge" aspect of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is
amply fulfilled.

State v. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.

As to the informant's veracity, defendant has also ignored the
detailed nature of the facts the informant described, a factor that
buttresses the reliability of the information.

State v. Purser,

828 P.2d at 517; State v. Brown, 798 P.2d at 284.

The informant

observed quantities of drugs, identified by both type and amount.
He identified the precise location where they would be found, down
to the piece of furniture, a footlocker.

He also described the

precise kind of scales, digital, and the fact that they would be
found in a particular dresser drawer. He identified the occupants
of the house, including the dog. He was able to take the officers
to the target home and identify it.

All of this information was

contained in the affidavit.
Furthermore, in order to test the informant's reliability
against independent information Officer Wilkinson himself knew to
be true, the officer asked the informant to identify other drug
10

dealers in the area (R. 62 or addendum a) . The informant did so by
naming seven individuals whom Officer Wilkinson knew to be involved
in the Iron County drug trade. This independent identification of
drug-related information further bolstered the informant's veracity
in the eyes of the officer.

State v. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.

Based on the totality of circumstances presented by the facts
commemorated in the affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial
basis for finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of
the warrant.

This Court should, therefore, affirm the trial

court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
OFFICER EXECUTING THE WARRANT ACTED IN AN
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE MANNER
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[e]vidence
obtained

by

officers

acting

in good

faith, objectively

and

reasonably relying on a search warrant issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate, need not be excluded even if the warrant is
subsequently invalidated by a lack of probable cause."

State v.

Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 711, cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)
(citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)). Because
the exclusionary

rule is aimed at deterring unlawful police

conduct, where an officer acts in an objectively reasonable manner,
there is simply no rationale for exclusion. United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. at 920-23.

11

Defendant's argument is that the officer's reliance on the
allegedly defective warrant was reckless and, therefore, that the
good faith exception to the warrant requirement should not apply.3
To support his allegation of recklessness, defendant lists
many of the same factors he asserted in his first argument,
specifically that: 1) the officer should have known the informant
was under the influence of drugs; 2) the informant had something to
gain from providing information; 3) the officer had never used the
informant before; 4) the officer had no personal knowledge of the
activities in the Marcos home; and 5) the officer did not attempt
to verify the informant's information (Br. of App. at 9-10).
None of these factors, however, is sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the officer in this case acted in good faith.
See United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1985)
(recognizing presumption of good faith reliance).

Thus, even if

this Court determines that the warrant was defective, suppression
would

not

be

appropriate

because

unreasonable police conduct to deter.

there

is

no

objectively

United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. at 920-23.
First, the trial court did not believe that the informant was
under the influence of drugs, nor was the court convinced that
being under the influence of drugs would have necessarily rendered
the informant's information unreliable (R. 56, 113) . Second, that

3

Defendant does not assert any violation of his state
constitutional rights. Therefore, this Court's analysis should
proceed solely under federal constitutional law. See, e.g., State
v. Horton, 848 P.2d at 710-711.
12

the informant would personally benefit only if he provided accurate
information weighs in favor of reasonable, rather than reckless,
reliance by the officer. Finally, while the officer had never used
this informant before and did not himself have personal knowledge
of the facts,4 he did his best to verify the information by
soliciting from the informant other, related facts that he could
personally verify.
The trial court determined that "the officers clearly acted in
an objectively reasonable manner in relying on the search warrant
in this case" (R. 53 or addendum b).

In explaining this ruling,

the court continued:
The officers here simply repeated the
observation of the informant, had him lead
them to the residence, attempted to verify his
credibility by checking his claim of knowledge
of others involved in drug trafficking in the
County and honestly related what they knew to
the magistrate. Suppression of the evidence
serves no legitimate purpose in such a
situation as there is no evidence of police
misconduct to be deterred.
(R. 53 or addendum b) .

The trial

court

ruling

accurately

represents the evidence before both the magistrate who signed the
warrant and the officers who relied upon that warrant.

Because

there was no credible evidence that the officer's reliance on the
warrant was "wholly unwarranted," this Court should affirm the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.

State v.

Horton, 848 P.2d at 711, cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).

4

One might question why an officer would bother with an
informant at all if he himself had personal knowledge of the
relevant facts.
13

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
ORAL ARGUMENT
The State does not request oral argument in this case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this #r/_ day of April, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

C JMJc
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to James M. Park, Attorney for Defendant, 965 South Main,
Suite 3, Cedar City, Utah

84720, this 30

day of April, 1995.
1995
yateuAMf

14

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUDGE, IN AND
FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
The undersigned, being first duly sworn deposes and says:
That your Affiant, Garth Wilkinson, is a peace officer employed by the Utah Department
of Public Safety, presently assigned as the Supervisor to the Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task
Force, has been a peace officer for in excess of twenty-four (24) years, and has reason to believe
the following, to wit:
That within a certain residence known as the •Marcos" residence, said residence being
more particularly described as a white frame home, with green trim, located on 2400 North and
Lund Highway in Iron County, State of Utah, said residence fronted by a dirt road on the north
side, and facing in a southerly direction, with a white travel trailer on the southwest side of said
residence, and a large stack of hay also located on the southwest side of said residence,
surrounded by several large trees and being the only residence between 2S00 North and Lund
Highway on the north side of the dirt road; and moreover, that within a certain Jeep Cherokee,
white in color, license plate number unknown, said vehicle being parked in front of the aforedescribed residence, your affiant has reason to believe there is now certain property or evidence
described as:

Controlled substances including marijuana and methamphetamine,
together with papers, checks, bills, notes, or other documents
relating to the purchase and sale of controlled substances;
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, has been used
or is being possessed with a purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public
offense, and consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party
to the illegal conduct.
I believe the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of
Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute, a Second-Degree Felony, and
Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, a Third-Degree Felony. The facts to establish
the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are as follows:
1.

On October 27, 1993, your affiant oversaw a "drug raid" involving fifteen (15)

peace officers in Iron County, State of Utah, serving nineteen (19) felony warrants on persons
charged with felony drug distribution in Iron County.
2.

On this date, your affiant was present during the arrest of an individual charged

with distributing methamphetamine (hereinafter referred to as "C.I." representing "confidential
informant"). Said C.I. told me the following, to wit: (a) that at the MMarcos" residence set forth
above, there are presently two (2) male Mexican individuals who travel to Iron County, State of
Utah, on a regular basis to deliver large quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine, (b) that
the only individual he knows by name is called "Marcos" and he speaks English, but the other
individual does not speak English, (c) that the C.I. was at the residence within the last twentyfour (24) hours and observed approximately five (5) pounds of marijuana and approximately onequarter (1/4) pound of the controlled substance methamphetamine, (d) that said C.I. has purchased
controlled substances from "Marcos" at the location described herein on several prior occasions,
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and (e) that said CI. could identify several other persons in the Iron County area who have
purchased marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine from "Marcos" at that location.
3.

That your affiant asserts that the C.I. is trustworthy and has provided reliable

information in that said CI. was asked to inform your affiant of all known drug buyers, users,
and sellers in the Iron County area, and said CI. told me of seven (7) individuals who are selling
or buying quantities of narcotics in Iron County. Your affiant, as a supervisor of the Narcotics
Task Force, can verify that the information provided by CI. is trustworthy and reliable.
Moreover, your affiant asserts that the information is reliable in that CI. is presently charged with
two (2) second-degree felonies and has been offered a plea agreement by the Iron County
Attorney wherein CI. would plead guilty to a third-degree felony in the event the information
is correct and there are large quantities of methamphetamine and marijuana at said residence
and/or vehicle.
4.

That your affiant asserts that I believe the information is trustworthy and reliable

in that CI. states CI. was at the residence last night, observed the marijuana and
methamphetamine in a "large foot locker" and also observed digital scales for weighing controlled
substances in "Marcos'" dresser drawer.
5.

That your affiant was informed by CI. that CI. believes "Marcos" and the other

unidentified male Mexican may attempt to flee the area if they observe narcotics officers.
Moreover, CI. informs me that they have a dog by the name of "Ginger" or also referred to as
"Here dog" who is vicious and will bite. Finally, CI. informs me that "Marcos" and the other
unidentified male have informed CI. that they are closely associated with the "Mexican mafia"
and that they may be dangerous and may pose a threat of violence to officers serving a search
warrant.

~3~

6.

WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure

of said items at the residence and/or within the vehicle which have been more particularly
described herein, said search warrant to be served in the daytime and without notice by law
enforcement officers.
DATED this

. day of October, 1993.
AFFIANT:

±£LAAA.

UltJJl^oJ^

GARTH WILKINSON
Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ / f f

hour of I^Ot

P.m.

a
9

HILIP
ifth District Judge

f
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dav of October, 1993, at the

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT
COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Garth Wilkinson,
Supervisor of the Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force, I am satisfied that within a certain
residence known as the 'Marcos" residence, said residence being more particularly described as
a white frame home, with green trim, located on 2400 North and Lund Highway in Iron County,
State of Utah, said residence fronted by a dirt road on the north side, and facing in a southerly
direction, with a white travel trailer on the southwest side of said residence, and a large stack of
hay also located on the southwest side of said residence, surrounded by several large trees and
being the only residence between 2500 North and Lund Highway on the north side of the dirt
road; and moreover, that within a certain Jeep Cherokee, white in color, license plate number
unknown, said vehicle being parked in front of the afore-described residence, your affiant has
reason to believe there is now certain property or evidence described as:
Controlled substances including marijuana and methamphetamine,
together with papers, checks, bills, notes, or other documents
relating to the purchase and sale of controlled substances;
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, is being
possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and
consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal
conduct.

YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED: in the daytime, to make a search of the
above-named or described premises and vehicle, for the hereinabove described property or
evidence, without announcing your presence as police officers and without notice, and if you find
the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth Judicial District Court,
County of Iron, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this
Court.
Given under my hand this

day of October, 1993, at the hour of /AWf
BY THE COURT:
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A.m.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
and ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 931500703

MARK J. HOBEL,
Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on defendant's Motion to Suppress on April 4, 1994.
The State was represented by Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, the defendant was present
and represented by James M. Park, his attorney. The Court heard brief evidence and oral
argument on the matter. The Court, having now reviewed the file and the authorities cited by
the parties, hereby enters the following decision and order.
In his written motion, defendant asserts that the affidavit in support of the search warrant
is insufficient to establish probable cause and that the "good faith" doctrine of United States vs.
Leon. 468 U. S. 897 (1984) should not be applied. At oral argument defendant also seemed to
raise the issue that the confidential informant was under the influence of drugs when he was
questioned by the affiant officer and that the officer failed to include that information in the
affidavit.
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The affiant officer, Garth E. Wilkinson, was called to testify. He testified that he has
over twenty years of experience in law enforcement and over 9 years experience in narcotics
investigations almost exclusively.

He testified that he is familiar with symptoms of drug

intoxication and that the confidential informant did not exhibit any evidence of being under the
influence of drugs during the interview.
The Court finds that there is no credible evidence that Mr. Wilkinson knew the informant
was under the influence of drugs during their discussion of the information included in his
affidavit. Likewise there is no evidence that Mr. Wilkinson concealed any known information
from the magistrate.
Turning to the issues raised in the written motion, the court must first consider whether
the affidavit supporting the search warrant is sufficient to establish probable cause.
The law of this State is clear that the Court must employ the "totality of the
circumstances" test in making this determination. fSee State v. Thurman. 846 P. 2d (Utah 1993);
State v. Hansen. 732 P. 2d 127 (Utah 1987).]

Probable cause is determined by a magistrate

who "make(s) a practical common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit. . ., including the 'veracity' and the 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place." (See State vs. Viph. 234 Utah Adv. Reports 44, 45.)
The affidavit here contains 9 paragraphs, some numbered and some unnumbered. The
affidavit states that on October 27, 1993, the affiant oversaw a large drug roundup in Iron

2

County. One of those arrested was the confidential informant. The informant then told the
affiant certain detailed information including:
a. there were two Mexican males present in a clearly identified house who regularly
delivered large quantities of drugs to Iron County,
b. that one speaks English, the other does not,
c. that the one who speaks English is called "Marcos",
d. that within the preceding 24 hours the informant had observed five pounds of
marijuana and one quarter pound of methamphetamine in the house,
e. that the informant had previously purchased controlled substances from "Marcos"
at that house on several occasions,
f. that there is a dog in the residence named "Ginger", also referred to as "Here dog"
which is vicious and will bite,
g. that the informant was in the residence the previous night and observed marijuana
and methamphetamine in a large footlocker and digital scales in "Marcos' "
dresser drawer,
h. that to prove his trustworthiness, the confidential informant claimed he could
identify several drug traffickers in the Iron County area,
i. that the confidential informant then identified seven individuals known to
the affiant

to be involved in the selling and buying of narcotics in the Iron

County area.

At the hearing on the motion the affiant testified, at the defendant's request, and said that
the informant took him to the "Marcos" home for identification purposes so a proper description
could be included in the affidavit.
The magistrate, heaving read the affidavit, determined that there was probable cause to
believe that there were drugs on the premises and a search warrant was issued which resulted
in the discovery and seizure of a large quantity of marijuana and methamphetamine.
The defendant claims that the Utah case of State v. Potter. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah
1993) is dispositive of this case.

This Court disagrees.

The Potter case stands for the

proposition that officers may not rely on assertions in an affidavit when they know, or should
know, that the assertions are false.

No such circumstance arises in this case.

Here the

confidential informant relayed information based on his own, personal observations within hours
of the execution of the affidavit. He had observed large quantities of drugs, he knew the types
of drugs, and he knew there were scales of a particular type in a particular place. He related
in some detail who was in the house, right down to the dog.

He led the officers to and

identified the house. Clearly his claimed knowledge was based on personal observation.
In an effort to determine whether they should rely on his assertions, the officers asked
the informant to name those persons involved in buying and selling drugs in Iron County, since
the informant claimed to be a frequent customer at the Marcos house. The informant named
seven persons known to the affiant as buyers and sellers of drugs.
Under the totality of the circumstances, common sense would indicate that there was a
4

fair probability that drugs would be found in the Marcos house.
The State also argues that even if the affidavit is insufficient, the Court should apply the
"good faith" exception articulated in U. S. v. Leon, supra and refuse to suppress the evidence.
The Court agrees with this argument.
If the affidavit does not establish probable cause, the officers clearly acted in an
objectively reasonable manner in relying on the search warrant in this case. Unlike Potter there
is no evidence in this case that would indicate that the magistrate . • .

"was misled by

information in the affidavit which the affiant knew was false or would have known was false
except for his reckless disregard for the truth." (See U. S. v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 923.)
The officers here simply repeated the observations of the informant, had him lead them
to the residence, attempted to verify his credibility by checking his claim of knowledge of others
involved in drug trafficking in the County and honestly related what they knew to the magistrate.
Suppression of the evidence serves no legitimate purpose in such a situation as there is no
evidence of police misconduct to be deterred. (See State vs. Potter. 221 U. A. R. 29, 31.)
The defendant's Motion is denied.

